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literacy” from a variety of platforms;
audiovisual media appear to have
become a substitute for print. Nevertheless, reading and viewing are not the
same thing, just as doing is different
from talking. (Stavridis has bridged this
gap with this publication—it is available
in both print and e-book formats.)
As the selections are based on the
author’s opinion, I will not question his
choices of fifty nonfiction and fiction
works by providing an alternative list
of my own. Doing so would defeat the
purpose of this review: explaining why
this book should be read and by whom.
Stavridis emphasizes the criteria he used
for selection in the fifty summaries he
provides of the works and their writers.
Topics include the oceans, explorers,
sailors in fiction, and sailors in nonfiction. He also recommends additional
works that expand on the topics chosen.
The book is not an anthology as
such but rather a guide to literature
by an English major with an MA
and a PhD. I recognize most of the
authors, but others are new and
revealing. Some selections on aviation,
amphibs, and naval support activities
ashore could have been added.
This single volume constitutes a
metaphorical book bag whose contents
can be read by a novice seaman, a
midgrade petty officer, or an experienced commander. Books do not
substitute for experience, but they do
provide insights when direct experience
has not presented itself, and they also
can support the later reflection that
puts experience into context. It also is
worth recommending that the books
be read and discussed with others, to
provide the broader understanding
that a collegial effort offers. Lastly, a
working definition of a literary classic
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is that when reread it offers further
understanding or amusement. Considering all these benefits together,
Stavridis wishes us “fair winds and
following seas” as we set sail on his
recommended literary voyage, charted
by a book lover for readers of all stripes.
CHARLES D. MELSON

China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power:
Theory, Practice, and Implications, by Michael A.
McDevitt. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2020. 320 pages. $39.95.

There is no longer any question that
China’s national destiny has become
tied inextricably to the maritime
domain. As distinct from naval power,
the term maritime power denotes the
projection of manifold instruments
of statecraft—military, political, and
economic—into the seas. Nevertheless,
China has affirmed that its maritime
strategy ultimately rests on the extent of
its navy. The naval dimension of China’s
maritime strategy is the central focus of
Michael A. McDevitt’s new book, China
as a Twenty First Century Naval Power:
Theory, Practice, and Implications.
McDevitt is a retired rear admiral in
the U.S. Navy and a senior fellow at the
Center for Naval Analyses. Although
unable to speak Chinese, he draws on a
rich array of translated English-language
primary-source documents, as well
as secondary sources from leading
contemporary scholars. The result is
an analysis both compelling and novel.
The book traces the development of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),
explores its role in defending China’s
national interests, and hypothesizes
its twenty-first-century trajectory.
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McDevitt’s point of entry is the
“Chinese dream,” a potent expression
of Chinese grand strategy propounded
by Xi Jinping. It is a vision of national
rejuvenation aimed at redressing the
“century of humiliation,” an epoch
that began with the First Opium War
(1839–42), in which the British laid bare
China’s vulnerability from the seas. The
sought-after Chinese dream represents
the culmination of yet another
century, the one that began with the
establishment of the People’s Republic
of China in 1949 and will be complete
in 2049. Given that a vast seaboard is a
permanent feature of China’s geopolitical makeup, Xi logically has concluded
that fulfillment of the dream requires
mastery of the maritime domain.
McDevitt systematically peels back the
layers of China’s near-seas defense by
elucidating the most likely scenario for
its deployment: a cross-strait conflict
with Taiwan. China’s “offshore waters
defense” consists of two aspects:
antiaccess and area-denial objectives.
Antiaccess means the preemption
of the entrance by American “first
responders”—air and naval forces
permanently stationed in Japan—into
the combat theater. Area-denial refers
to a sequenced strategy of coercion,
neutralization of Taiwan and regional airpower, and invasion, aimed
at defeating enemies within the combat
theater before they can gain operational
and tactical freedom of action.
However, PLAN activity hardly is limited to China’s near seas. The country’s
increasing national power has yielded
a proliferation in the global arena of
economic and political interests—which
simultaneously constitute maritimesecurity imperatives. McDevitt states
that China’s maritime strategy is driven
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by a heightened awareness of these
global interests, which has produced a
“sea lane anxiety.” Consequently, Beijing
has deemed the security of China’s sea
lines of communication an “imminent
issue”—as vital an interest as protection
of the nation itself. With the rollout of
its Belt and Road Initiative, China is
expected to shift its maritime strategy
by gradually adding “open seas protection” to “offshore waters defense.”
China has been developing its capabilities to operate beyond the first island
chain since the 1980s. However, only
within the last twenty years has the
PLAN become a truly global force.
One of McDevitt’s contributions to
the literature is an understanding of
precisely how the Chinese accelerated
so rapidly along a blue-water learning
curve. He contends that from 2008
onward, China’s participation in the
multinational antipiracy effort in the
Gulf of Aden and northern Arabian
Sea served as a “blue water laboratory” through which crews gathered
experience “in terms of operations, ship
design, training, and, most importantly,
logistical support to the fleet” (p. 31).
Through the policy of “build a little, test
a little,” China has used this blue-water
laboratory to develop a formidable
far-seas force built to be congruent
with the demands of defending the
country’s burgeoning interests. Over
the last fifteen years, China has added
240 warships to its navy, 131 of which
are blue-water-capable ships, including
carriers, other surface combatants,
amphibious assault ships, submarines,
and fleet-replenishment ships. Although
the Chinese have yet to deploy a
carrier-centered task force, McDevitt
forecasts that this will take place in
the near future. At that point, China
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undeniably will have become a bluewater naval power. The book rounds out
its analysis of China’s coercive maritime
power with appendices written by
experts on the China Coast Guard
and the country’s maritime militia.
Although not all the details of China’s
vision of a “world-class navy” are clear,
McDevitt projects that the PLAN will
outnumber the U.S. Navy in ships
by 2035. As the American advantage
gradually erodes, a deliberate assessment of the strategic situation will
become even more imperative. With
that in mind, the present work, which
consolidates and updates the advances
made in Chinese maritime-strategic
studies, will serve well any professional
within the field. It provides an incisive
complement to Toshi Yoshihara and
James Holmes’s tour de force, Red Star
over the Pacific (2010). McDevitt has
delivered a work both scholarly and enduring, one that will provide a theoretical foothold for understanding China’s
naval development for years to come.
FRANCIS MIYATA

The Day After: Why America Wins the War but
Loses the Peace, by Brendan R. Gallagher. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2019. 308 pages. $32.95.

Brendan Gallagher has written what
will be the best book on this topic
for at least the next several years, and
probably for many more. It should be
required reading for every person within
the U.S. national-security enterprise,
as well as anyone with an interest in
security, postconflict actions, and nation
building. The Day After is excellently
written, academically rigorous, and
convincing. It is a must-read.
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Gallagher is a serving lieutenant colonel
(infantry) in the U.S. Army and stands
tall among the rare breed known as
warrior-scholars. He has served seven
tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, including
multiple deployments with the 75th
Ranger Regiment, and currently is a
battalion commander; so much for
establishing his warrior credentials. His
academic bona fides include winning
the General George C. Marshall Award
as the top graduate in his class at the
Army’s Command and General Staff
College and completing a PhD in public
and international affairs at Princeton.
Put simply, Gallagher wants to know
why the United States has dominated
the battlefield in many conflicts, only
to watch subsequent efforts to secure
the peace fail—often dramatically. A
single failure might be brushed off
as a one-of-a-kind event, but when
failures become repetitive, something
is wrong. Clearly the old adage about
the burned hand teaching best does
not apply; rather than learning from a
hand singed by the hot stove, the United
States keeps grabbing for the burner.
It should be pointed out that The Day
After was published before the American
withdrawal from Afghanistan, which
gives an air of prescience to the work.
Gallagher’s introduction lays out his
research with both precision and
passion. Why does the United States
win massive battlefield victories and
seemingly create conditions to achieve
long-lasting, positive change, only to
watch the moment pass, opportunities
dwindle, and failure eventually result?
He also makes it clear that while his
approach is grounded in strong scholarship and academic rigor, his involvement
is not that of a distant inhabitant of the
ivory tower. In his own words: “Most
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